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The belief that bank runs and failures contribute to 
instability in aggregate economic activity is both long-
standing and widely held. Indeed, the Federal Reserve 
Act of 1913 and the Banking Act of 1933 and of 1935 
were partly intended to correct what were thought to be 
inherent instabilities in the banking industry. Such leg-
islation, it was hoped, would reduce or eliminate these 
inherent instabilities and thereby reduce the magnitude 
of fluctuations in all economic activity. This paper 
challenges the conventional wisdom about the histori-
cal causes of bank runs and failures and about the 
relationship between these runs and failures and aggre-
gate activity. This challenge is based on a theoretical 
approach that explicitly models financial intermedia-
tion and monetary arrangements and on a comparative 
study of banking and aggregate fluctuations in the 
United States and Canada during the years 1870-1913. 
In a previous Quarterly Review article (Williamson 
1987b), I reviewed some recent developments in the 
theory of financial intermediation. This new financial 
intermediation literature is somewhat diverse, but the 
models generally follow the approach of specifying 
an economic environment in terms of primitives— 
preferences, endowments, and technology—and then 
analyzing how that environment generates financial 
intermediation. Several things are gained from this type 
of approach: a deeper understanding of the role of 
financial intermediaries as institutions that diversify, 
transform assets, and process information; possible 
explanations for bank runs; insights into the role of 
financial intermediaries in aggregate fluctuations; and 
implications for the effects of financial regulations. 
One branch of this financial intermediation litera-
ture, stemming from the work of Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), focuses on deposit contracts, bank runs, and 
bank failures. In the Diamond and Dybvig model, the 
banking system has an inherent instability. Banks pro-
vide a form of insurance through the withdrawal provi-
sion in deposit contracts. But then banks are left open 
to runs, during which the expectation of the failure of 
an otherwise safe bank is self-fulfilling. (This branch of 
the literature includes Postlewaite and Vives 1987, 
Wallace 1988, and Williamson 1988.) 
Another branch of the financial intermediation 
literature—which includes work by Diamond (1984), 
Boyd and Prescott (1986), and Williamson (1986)— 
is concerned with financial intermediation in general 
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(rather than banking in particular). It is also concern-
ed with the features of economic environments (mor-
al hazard, adverse selection, and monitoring and 
evaluation costs) that can lead to intermediary struc-
tures. Models of this type have been integrated into 
macroeconomic frameworks by Williamson (1987c), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Greenwood and 
Williamson (1989) to study the implications of finan-
cial intermediation for aggregate fluctuations. A gen-
eral conclusion of this work is that the financial interme-
diation sector tends to amplify fluctuations. Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989) show how a redistribution of wealth 
from borrowers to lenders increases the agency costs 
associated with lending, thereby causing a decrease in 
the quantity of intermediation and in real output. Such 
a wealth redistribution might be associated with debt 
deflations. Williamson (1987c) shows how some kinds 
of aggregate technology shocks, which produce no 
fluctuations in an environment without the information 
costs that generate an intermediary structure, do cause 
fluctuations when these costs are present. (See Gertler 
1988 for a survey of other related work.) 
This paper has two purposes. First, for those unfamil-
iar with the recent literature on financial intermediation, 
it shows how an explicit general equilibrium model 
with endogenous financial intermediation can illumi-
nate some central issues in banking and macroeco-
nomics and can organize some historical experience 
and empirical evidence. Second, for those familiar with 
the intermediation literature, this paper shows how a 
model related to models of Williamson (1987c) and 
Greenwood and Williamson (1989) can be used to 
study bank runs and failures. The model here has some 
novel implications for the role of financial regulations 
and bank failures in aggregate fluctuations, and I find 
some (qualified) empirical support for its predictions. 
The approach I take is the following. First, I study a 
historical period when monetary and banking arrange-
ments in two countries were strikingly different but 
when other factors affecting aggregate fluctuations 
were quite similar. Next, I construct a general equi-
librium model with endogenous financial intermedia-
tion. The model can incorporate the financial arrange-
ments of each country as special cases. Then I study the 
implications of the differences in banking and mone-
tary arrangements for aggregate fluctuations in the two 
countries. Last, I go to the data and judge whether the 
model fits the evidence. 
The period I focus on is the 44-year span from 1870 
to 1913, and the two countries are Canada and the 
United States. Over this period, Canada had a branch 
banking system with about 40 chartered banks. In 
contrast (in 1890), the United States had more than 
8,000 banks, mostly unit banks. Numerous restrictions 
on branching, along with other constraints absent in 
Canada, tended to keep U.S. banks small. Canadian 
banks were free to issue private circulating notes with 
few restrictions on their backing, but all circulating 
currency in the United States was effectively an obli-
gation of the U.S. government. In addition to these 
differences in banking and monetary arrangements, the 
countries had different records of bank runs and 
failures. Average bank depositor losses as a fraction of 
deposits were roughly 60 percent larger in the United 
States than in Canada. Also, cooperative behavior 
among Canadian banks acted to virtually preempt any 
widespread banking panics, so that disruption from 
financial crises was considerably smaller in Canada. In 
marked contrast, widespread bank runs and failures 
characterized U.S. history during the National Banking 
Era (1864-1913), as documented by Sprague (1910). 
The model presented here captures the important 
features of Canadian and U.S. monetary and banking 
arrangements during 1870-1913. It is related to other 
models constructed by Williamson (1987c) and Green-
wood and Williamson (1989) in that it has costly state 
verification (Townsend 1979), which provides a dele-
gated monitoring role for financial intermediaries 
(Diamond 1984, Williamson 1986). When the model 
includes a restriction on diversification by financial 
intermediaries, interpreted here as a unit banking re-
striction, banks fail with positive probability. When 
they fail, banks experience something that can be inter-
preted as a bank run. In contrast, banks not subject 
to the unit banking restriction diversify perfectly and 
never fail. 
When subjected to aggregate technological shocks, 
the model yields patterns of comovement in the data 
that are qualitatively similar whether or not there is a 
unit banking restriction or a constraint that banks 
cannot issue circulating notes. The price level, bank 
liabilities, and output are mutually positively corre-
lated. Two important results are 
•Under the unit banking restriction, bank failures 
are high when output is low, but the unit banking 
restriction actually makes output less volatile. 
•When private note issue is prohibited, output is less 
volatile. 
These two results are consistent with the view that 
intermediation amplifies fluctuations: since both re-
21 strictions inhibit intermediation, both reduce the mag-
nitude of fluctuations. 
Banks fail for a quite different reason in my model 
than in Diamond and Dybvig's (1983). Here, the unit 
banking restriction results in a banking system in which 
banks are less diversified than they would be other-
wise. These banks are therefore more sensitive to idio-
syncratic shocks, and they experience runs and fail with 
higher probability. In Diamond and Dybvig's model, 
bank runs and failures occur because of an inherent 
instability associated with the structure of deposit con-
tracts, and runs can be prevented by suspending con-
vertibility or providing deposit insurance. But the 
Diamond-Dybvig model cannot confront the Cana-
dian/U.S. differences during 1870-1913. It also has 
difficulty with the Great Depression, when Canada 
experienced no bank failures while U.S. banks were 
failing in unprecedentedly large numbers. During the 
Depression, deposit contracts in Canada and the United 
States were similar, no Canadian banks suspended 
convertibility, and Canada had no deposit insurance. 
(For a study of Canadian banking in the Depression, 
see Haubrich 1987.) 
The model's implication that the unit banking restric-
tion reduces fluctuations contradicts conventional wis-
dom about the role of bank failures in the business 
cycle. Several studies have argued that bank failures 
propagated negative aggregate shocks during the Great 
Depression. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) see the 
propagation mechanism as acting through measured 
monetary aggregates, while Bernanke (1983) and 
Hamilton (1987) argue that there are additional, non-
monetary effects of intermediation on real activity. 
To capture U.S. banking arrangements after World 
War II, I introduce a government deposit insurance 
program in the model. Here, monitoring is delegated to 
the government in a unit banking system. The govern-
ment uses its power to tax to effect transfers from 
depositors in healthy banks to depositors in failed 
banks. Essentially, the government performs the same 
intermediation function in the unit banking economy 
as does a well-diversified private financial intermediary 
in the economy with no financial regulations. The de-
posit insurance system acts to eliminate bank runs and 
their associated costs in the unit banking economy, 
though it cannot eliminate bank failures (just as some 
individual firms fail in the economy with perfectly 
diversified banks). Therefore, after World War II, when 
U.S. and Canadian banks face the same restrictions on 
private note issue and U.S. deposits are insured, the two 
countries should experience similar macroeconomic 
behavior, other things held constant. 
To match the model's predictions with the data, I 
examine detrended annual gross national product 
(GNP) and aggregate banking data for Canada and 
the United States during 1870-1913 and 1954-1987. 
For the 1870-1913 period, new GNP data have re-
cently been constructed for Canada by Urquhart (1986) 
and for the United States by Romer (1989) and Balke 
and Gordon (1989). These new data make the study of 
this period of particularly current interest. The two U.S. 
GNP series have similar long-run properties but quite 
different cyclical properties, so including both gives 
some idea of how the results are sensitive to measure-
ment problems. 
Of the aggregate data I examine, the GNP data 
provide the strongest support for the theory. For 1870-
1913, the volatility of Canadian GNP is higher than 
that of U.S. GNP according to both the Romer data 
(56 percent) and the Balke and Gordon data (11 per-
cent). For 1954-1987, GNP volatility in the two coun-
tries is approximately equal. Price level volatility is 
higher in Canada for the 1870-1913 period, but in the 
1954-1987 data some inconsistencies with the model 
appear regarding price level volatility and comove-
ments of prices with output. In apparent contradiction 
to the theory, bank liabilities are less volatile in 
Canada than in the United States during 1870-1913; 
however, there are good reasons to believe that this 
difference in volatility reflects measurement error in 
the U.S. data. 
The paper is organized as follows. I begin by 
reviewing Canadian and U.S. monetary and banking 
arrangements in 1870-1913. Then I construct the 
model (a version of it for each country's economy) and 
describe its implications for aggregate fluctuations. 
Next I discuss the empirical evidence. Finally, I sum-
marize how well the model fits that evidence and 
conclude with possible implications for policy. 
Money and Banking in Canada and 
the United States, 1870-1913 
During the 1870-1913 period, Canada's branch bank-
ing system, patterned after Scottish arrangements, 
consisted of, at most, 41 chartered banks. In 1890, 
when Canada's population was slightly less than one-
tenth of the United States', Canada's 38 chartered 
banks had 426 branches nationwide. The granting of a 
bank charter required federal legislation, which created 
a significant barrier to entry. However, once given a 
charter, a bank faced few restrictions, at least compared 
to U.S. banks. 
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Chart 1 
Percentage Deviations From Trend of U.S. Output and Bank Failures, 1870-1913* 
1870  1875  1880  1885  1890  1895  1900  1905  1910 
'Computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (see Prescott 1983). For bank failures, the percentage deviations are divided by 10. 
Sources of basic data: Romer 1989, U.S. Department of Commerce 1975 
The government of Canada had a monopoly on the 
issue of small-denomination notes during 1870-1913, 
but circulating currency in large denominations con-
sisted mostly of bank notes (Johnson 1910). Canadian 
banks could issue notes in denominations of $4 and 
more (raised to $5 in 1880). A bank's note issue was 
limited by its capital, but this constraint does not seem 
to have been binding on the system as a whole through 
most of the period.
1 There was a limited issue of 
Dominion notes (federal government currency), backed 
25 percent by gold and 75 percent by government 
securities, with additional issues backed 100 percent by 
gold. Legislation periodically increased the limit on the 
fractionally gold-backed component of government-
issued currency. 
There were no Canadian reserve requirements,
2 but 
after 1890, 5 percent of note circulation was held on 
deposit in a central bank circulation redemption fund. 
This added insurance was essentially redundant, since 
notes were made senior claims on bank assets in 1880. 
Most bank notes appear to have circulated at par, 
especially after 1890 legislation that required redemp-
tion of notes in certain cities throughout Canada. 
In the same period, the United States had a unit 
banking system, as it still does today. There were few 
barriers to entry in the banking industry, but banks 
faced numerous restrictions, which tended to keep 
them small and limit diversification. In 1890, the 
United States had about 8,200 banks, including nearly 
3,500 national banks (U.S. Department of Commerce 
1975). Circulating paper currency consisted mainly of 
national bank notes (in denominations of $ 1 and more) 
and notes issued directly by the U.S. Treasury. National 
bank notes were more than fully backed by federal 
government bonds at the time of issue and were guar-
anteed by the federal government. All banks were 
subject to reserve requirements. 
During the National Banking Era, the U.S. banking 
system was subject to recurrences of widespread panic 
and bank failure, as is well known. Pervasive financial 
'In 1907, this constraint on note issue appears to have become binding 
during the crop-moving season. At that time, the Canadian government 
instituted a temporary rediscounting arrangement with the banks. The arrange-
ment was made permanent with the Finance Act of 1914. 
2If reserves were held, one-third (40 percent after 1880) had to be held in 
the form of Dominion notes. 
23 crises occurred in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907 
(Sprague 1910). Chart 1 plots percentage deviations 
from trend in GNP and in bank suspensions in the 
United States between 1870 and 1913. There is clearly 
negative comovement, with a correlation coefficient of 
—0.25, between the series. Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) and Cagan (1965) also find that panic periods 
tend to be associated with declines in real output growth 
and with increases in the currency-to-deposit ratio. 
The striking difference in the incidence of bank 
failure in Canada and the United States during the 
Great Depression has been noted by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) and Bernanke (1983) and studied by 
Haubrich (1987). Between 1923 and 1985, no Cana-
dian banks failed; but from 1930 to 1933, more than 
9,000 U.S. banks suspended operations. The record of 
bank failures in the two countries during 1870-1913, 
while showing less striking differences than in the 
Depression, also indicates that the incidence of bank 
failure was lower and the disruptive effects of bank 
failures were much smaller in Canada than in the 
United States. 
Evidence supporting these observations appears in 
Table 1, which displays statistics on bank liquidations 
in Canada during 1870-1913. In total, Canada had 
23 bank liquidations while, at the same time, the United 
States had 3,208. This evidence, however, clearly 
overstates the difference between Canadian and U.S. 
bank failure rates, since Canadian banks were larger 
than U.S. banks and since Canadian GNP and popula-
tion were less than one-tenth of the corresponding 
quantities in the United States over the period. Thus, 
the failure of an average-sized Canadian bank would 
potentially have had a much larger effect on the 
Canadian economy than the failure of an average-sized 
U.S. bank would have had on the U.S. economy. 
According to Table 1, noteholders of failed banks 
received 100 percent of the face value of their liabili-
ties in 20 of the 23 Canadian bank liquidations, and 
depositors received 100 percent in 12 of the 23. This 
might indicate relatively little economic disruption 
from Canadian bank failures, but that conclusion 
requires comparable statistics for the United States. 
These are provided in Table 2, which displays some 
data on bank depositors' losses in Canada and the 
United States. On average, in the years under study, 
losses to depositors were 0.07 percent of total deposits 
in Canada and 0.11 percent in the United States. By this 
measure, the disruption from bank failures appears to 
have been significantly smaller—57 percent smaller— 
in Canada than in the United States. 
Table 1 
Canada's 23 Chartered Bank Liquidations, 1870-1913 
% of Face Value of 
Bank Liabilities Paid to 
Year of Bank Liabilities at 
Suspension Suspension (Can. $) Noteholders Depositors 
1873  106,914  .00  .00 
1876  293,379  100.00  100.00 
1879  547,238  57.50  57.50 
136,480  100.00  96.35 
1,794,249  100.00  100.00 
340,500  100.00  100.00 
1881  1,108,000  59.SO  59.50 
1883  2,868,884  100.00  66.38 
1887  1,409,482  100.00  10.66 
74,364  100.00  100.00 
1,031,280  100.00  100.00 
2,631,378  100.00  99.66 
1888  3,449,499  100.00  100.00 
1893  1,341,251  100.00  100.00 
1895  7,761,209  100.00  75.25 
1899  1,766,841  100.00  17.50 
1905  388,660  100.00  100.00 
1906  15,272,271  100.00  100.00 
1908  16,174,408  100.00  100.00 
560,781  100.00  30.27 
1,172,630  100.00  100.00 
1910  549,830  100.00  100.00 
1,997,041  100.00  .00 
Source: Beckhart 1929 (pp. 480-81) 
Further, Canadian chartered banks had cooperative 
arrangements that tended to lessen the adverse effects 
of bank failures. Canadian banks were mainly self-
regulated, with a formal organization, the Canadian 
Bankers' Association, established in 1891 and given 
special powers through legislation in 1900. The largest 
banks, particularly the Bank of Montreal, appear to 
have been willing to act as informal lenders of last 
resort and to step in to help reorganize troubled banks. 
This excerpt from Johnson (1910, pp. 124-25) is 
illustrative: 
On the evening of October 12 [1906] the bankers in 
Toronto and Montreal heard with surprise that the Bank of 
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Table 2 
Bank Depositor Losses as a Percentage 
of Total Deposits 
Country and Year  Annual Percentage* 
Canada** 
1873  .03% 
1879  .15 
1881  .20 
1883  .69 
1887  .87 
1895  .89 
1899  .47 
1908  .04 
1910  .14 
1914  .05 
1867-1920  .07% 
United States 
1865-1880  .19% 
1881-1900  .12 
1901-1920  .04 
1865-1920  .11% 
*For multiyear spans, average annual losses as a percentage of 
deposits were computed first and then averaged. 
'"For years not included, the annual percentage of losses to 
deposits was zero. 
Sources: Beckhart 1929, FDIC 1941 
Ontario had got beyond its depth and would not open its 
doors the next morning. . . . The leading bankers in the 
Dominion dreaded the effect which the failure of such a 
bank might have. The Bank of Montreal agreed to take 
over the assets and pay all the liabilities, provided a 
number of other banks would agree to share with it any 
losses. Its offer was accepted and a representative of the 
Bank of Montreal took the night train for Toronto. Going 
breakfastless to the office of the Bank of Ontario he found 
the directors at the end of an all-night session and laid 
before them resolutions officially transferring the business 
and accounts of the bank to the Bank of Montreal. They 
adopted the resolution before 9 a.m. and the bank opened 
business for the day with the following notice over the 
door: "This is the Bank of Montreal." 
Before 1 o'clock the same notice, painted on a board or 
penciled on brown wrapping paper, was over the door of 
the 31 branches in different parts of the Dominion. Its 
customers were astonished that day when they went to the 
bank, but none of them took alarm and many of them were 
well pleased with the change. 
The collective behavior of Canadian banks not only 
served to minimize the costs of liquidating insolvent 
institutions; it also appears to have prevented wide-
spread banking panics. Any bank runs seem to have 
been confined to individual banks or branches (U.S. 
Congress 1910). Although U.S. banks had cooperative 
arrangements during the National Banking Era, par-
ticularly clearinghouses (Gorton 1985), the ability of 
U.S. banks to act as a single coalition could not ap-
proach that of their Canadian counterparts. 
The Model 
I now construct a model that captures the essential 
features of the banking and monetary structures of 
Canada and the United States during the 1870-1930 
period. 
I have already described two important differences 
between Canadian and U.S. banking and monetary 
arrangements at that time. One is that Canadian bank 
liabilities were much less subject to idiosyncratic risk 
than were U.S. bank liabilities. The Canadian system let 
Canadian banks become larger than U.S. banks, and 
branch banking allowed greater geographical diversi-
fication. Further, the cooperative behavior among 
Canadian banks helped to insure depositors against 
losses. The second important difference is related to 
the fact that Canadian banks could issue circulating 
notes in large denominations and back them with 
private assets. In the United States, only national banks 
could issue notes, and these notes had to be backed 
111 percent by U.S. government bonds. Thus, Canadian 
bank notes could perform an intermediation function 
whereas U.S. bank notes could not (to the extent that 
breaking government bonds into small denominations 
is an insignificant function compared to the intermedia-
tion normally done by banks). 
The model should be able to replicate the differences 
of the Canadian and U.S. experiences with regard to 
bank failures. That is, bank failures should be nega-
tively correlated with aggregate activity, and the inci-
dence of bank failure should be higher in the model U.S. 
economy than in the model Canadian economy. 
The model constructed here is related to the models 
of Williamson (1987c) and Greenwood and Williamson 
(1989) but differs from them somewhat to capture the 
problem at hand. The model abstracts from reserve 
requirements, interest-bearing government debt, and 
the operation of the gold standard monetary regime. 
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• Environment 
The Canadian economy is modeled as a closed econ-
omy with a continuum of two-period-lived agents born 
in each period t = 1,2,3, The measure of a 
generation is N. Each generation has two types of 
economic agents, lenders and entrepreneurs. Lenders 
each receive an indivisible endowment of one unit of 
time when young and maximize 
where 
Et = the expectation operator conditional 
on period t information 
<5 = an individual-specific parameter denoting 
the value to a lender of consuming leisure 
/, = leisure 
et — effort expended 
ct — consumption. 
Lenders can use their single unit of time in period t 
either to produce one unit of the period t consumption 
good or to consume one unit of leisure. Entrepreneurs 
have no endowments of time, the consumption good, or 
effort in either period of life. 
A generation t entrepreneur has access at period t to 
an investment project that requires K units of the time t 
consumption good as input in order to operate, where K 
is an integer greater than 1. If funded in period t} the 
project yields a random return w in period t+ 1, where 
Pr[w< w] = H(w, 0, </>,); here, //(•, % •) is differentiable 
in all its arguments and is twice differentiable in its first 
argument. Let h(xv, 0, 0) = DxH(wy 0, 0) denote the 
probability density function, which is positive on [0, w ]. 
The variable 0, affects the investment projects of 
all entrepreneurs, and 0 is an entrepreneur-specific 
parameter that orders probability distributions accord-
ing to first-order stochastic dominance. That is, 
D2H(W, 0, 0,) < 0 for 0 < w < W. Project quality strictly 
improves as 0 increases. For fixed 0, an increase in 0 
produces an increase in the riskiness of the project 
return without changing its expected value. That is, an 
increase in 0 is a mean-preserving spread (Rothschild 
and Stiglitz 1970) which is carried out in such a way 
that probability mass is shifted only for lower values 
of w. Specifically, 
Cw 
J0 D3H(X, 0, 0) dx < 0 for 0 < w < vv 
D3//(jt, 0, 0) = 0 for w > K 
j"xD3h(x} 0, 0) dx = 0. 
Assume that the aggregate shock 0, follows a two-
state Markov process. That is, 0, = 0,- for i— 1,2, and 
Pr[0,+1 = 0, 10, = 0,] = qx for / = 1,2, where 0 <qt< 1 
and 02 >0, for/= 1,2 and qx > q2. Aggregate shocks 
are therefore nonnegatively serially correlated, and all 
project returns are riskier in state 2 than in state 1. 
Project returns are independently distributed across 
entrepreneurs. There is costly state verification (as in 
Townsend 1979, 1988). That is, entrepreneurs can 
observe the return on their own project w, but any other 
agent expends y units of effort to observe w. 
Lenders who choose to produce the consumption 
good in period t save the entire amount by acquiring fiat 
money or investing (directly or indirectly) in an entre-
preneur's project. There is a fixed quantity of M0 units of 
perfectly divisible fiat money in the hands of a group of 
old agents at t— 1. These agents supply fiat money 
inelastically to maximize consumption. Claims on 
period t+ 1 consumption exchanged for the period t 
consumption good can take one of two forms: deposit 
claims or notes. Deposits and notes are identical from 
the point of view of the issuer, but a lender who holds a 
deposit incurs a cost of fi units of effort and a noteholder 
incurs a cost of a units of effort. No costs are associated 
with holding fiat money. The parameters a and P are 
lender-specific, as is 8. 
The fact that asset claims are named deposits and 
notes at this stage in the analysis is premature, since I 
have not yet established that arrangements correspond-
ing to real-world banking institutions might arise here. 
However, to look ahead, my aim is to generate demand 
functions for two types of intermediary liabilities, 
deposits and notes, which are both backed by the same 
portfolio of loans to entrepreneurs. With costs of 
holding the two liabilities differing among lenders, it is 
simple to obtain well-defined demand functions for 
intermediary liabilities. These can be obtained without 
explicitly specifying the spatial and informational fea-
tures that cause some agents to prefer one type of 
intermediary liability to another, even if their returns 
are identical. In terms of the ultimate optimal financial 
arrangement, f3 can be interpreted as the cost of 
carrying out an exchange using a check-writing tech-
nology rather than fiat currency. Similarly, a can be 
interpreted as the cost in inconvenience associated with 
holding a large-denomination bank note as opposed to 
perfectly divisible fiat money. These costs might plau-
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sibly be thought to differ among individuals or types of 
transactions. 
To obtain simple demand functions for intermedi-
ary liabilities, assume there are three types of lenders: 
Type 1 lenders have a = (3 =
 00, type 2 lenders have 
6 = 0 and p =
 00, and type 3 lenders have 5 = 0 and 
a =
 00. Within any generation, the fraction of agents 
who are type i lenders is 77, . The measure of agents in 
a generation with <5 < d' is r]{A(5'), the measure with 
a < a is r]2B(a ), and the measure with (3 < is 
rj3F(p
r). Here, A(-), B(-), and F(-) are distribution func-
tions that give the distribution of parameter values 
across each lender type. Let a(d) = ZM(<5), b(a) = 
DB(a), and/(j8) = DF(P), where a(-), &(•), and/(•) are 
positive on R+. In equilibrium, type 1 lenders will 
substitute as a group between consuming leisure and 
holding fiat money, type 2 lenders will substitute 
between fiat money and notes, and type 3 lenders will 
substitute between fiat money and deposits. 
Let rj4 denote the fraction of agents who are entre-
preneurs, with 774G(0') being the fraction of agents who 
are entrepreneurs with 0 ^ 0'. Let g(6) = DG(6), with 
g(-) positive on [0, 0] for 0 > 0. Assume that 
f*xh(x, e,<f>l)dx>K 
{™xh(x, 0,<t>x)dx<K 
and r]4K< rj2 + 773. Therefore, in the equilibrium to be 
examined, there will always be some projects funded, 
some projects not funded, and some lenders of each 
type holding fiat money. 
• Financial Arrangements 
For investment projects to be financed, lenders and 
entrepreneurs need to make contractual arrangements. 
As in the costly state verification setups of Townsend 
(1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson 
(1986, 1987a), assume the following commitment 
technology and sequence of moves by the contracting 
parties. In any period t, the lenders jointly funding 
investment projects agree among themselves on rules 
for dividing the period t + 1 payments from entrepre-
neurs. No lender can observe payments made to other 
lenders by the entrepreneur. Lenders make commit-
ments in period t about how they will respond to 
declarations by an entrepreneur at t + 1 about the 
project outcome, and payment schedules are set. In 
period t+ 1, an entrepreneur declares a particular 
project outcome w
d, and a lender then incurs the veri-
fication cost if w
d e S or does not incur the cost if w
d q 5, 
where S is the verification set. Note that stochastic 
verification is ruled out.
3 Payments from the entrepre-
neur to lenders depend on the entrepreneur's declara-
tion and on the results of the lenders' state verification, 
if it occurs. 
Let rt denote the market expected return per unit of 
the consumption good invested by lenders in entrepre-
neurs' projects, and let Rt(w) denote the payment to the 
lenders in a given project by an entrepreneur. Then 
(from Williamson 1987c and Greenwood and William-
son 1989) the following is an optimal arrangement: 
Lenders delegate monitoring to a financial interme-
diary (as in Diamond 1984 and Williamson 1986). The 
entrepreneur makes a noncontingent payment of xt to 
the intermediary if w > xt and pays the intermediary w if 
w < xr The expected return to the intermediary is then 
(1) 7T(xr 0, ) = fo'(w-y)h(w, 6, 0,) dw 
+ xt[\~H(xt, 6, </>,)] 
or, integrating by parts, 
(2) 7r(xr 0, </>,) = x, ~fo'H(w, 0, </>,) dw 
- yH(xr 0, </>,). 
The optimal contract between an intermediary and an 
entrepreneur is a debt contract (as in Gale and Hellwig 
1985 and Williamson 1987a). That is, a fixed payment 
is promised; if the entrepreneur cannot meet it, then 
bankruptcy occurs and the entrepreneur consumes 
zero. The verification cost 7 can be interpreted as a cost 
of bankruptcy. 
Intuitively, this contract is optimal for two reasons: 
First, incentive compatibility requires that the payment 
be noncontingent if verification does not occur. Second, 
since risk neutrality implies that risk sharing is not a 
factor here, maximizing the payment in verification 
states minimizes the probability of verification and 
therefore minimizes expected verification costs. 
Assume that 7r(jt, 0, </>,) is strictly concave in its 
first argument for 0 e [0, 0] and (/>, = (f>i for i = 1,2. 
Then there is a unique a(0, <f>t) such that 7r(x, 0, </>,) 
3 As Townsend (1988) shows, allowing for stochastic verification in more 
general setups yields an optimal arrangement that generally bears little 
resemblance to a simple debt contract. Restricting attention to nonstochastic 
monitoring in my context lends considerable tractability to the analysis. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show how, in a model with some similar features, 
some of their results remain intact with stochastic verification. This suggests 
that the operating characteristics of my model may not change if the restriction 
on verification were relaxed. 
27 reaches a maximum for x = ct(0,with fixed 0 and </>, 
and a(0,</>r) e (0, vv). Entrepreneurs for whom 
7r(cj(0, </>,), 0, </>,) > receive loans, while those 
with 7r(a(0, </>,), < do not. For the entre-
preneurs receiving loans, the promised payment xt 
satisfies 
(3) 7T (xr6^t) = rtK. 
Note that xt decreases with 0; that is, the loan interest 
rate is lower for higher-quality projects. 
Financial intermediaries are those type 3 lenders 
with (3 = 0. These intermediaries can commit to making 
noncontingent payments of rt to each of their depositors 
and noteholders by holding large portfolios and achiev-
ing perfect diversification.
4 Since each of an inter-
mediary's depositors and noteholders receives rt with 
certainty, the liability holders never need to monitor the 
intermediary. 
This optimal arrangement captures some important 
features of financial intermediation arrangements 
observed in the real world. In the model, intermediaries 
diversify, transform assets, process information, and 
hold debt in their portfolios. 
• Equilibrium 
In equilibrium, there is some 6't such that entrepreneurs 
with 0 > Q't receive loans while those with 0 < 0't do not. 
Let x\ denote the promised payment for the marginal 
borrower; that is, x\ — o(0'r </>,). Then 
(4) 7r(x't, 0'r <f>t) = rtK 
(5) Dx Hx;, 0,', </>,) = 0. 
Since 7r(% % •) is concave in its first argument, equations 
(4) and (5) solve for x't and Q't given rv Using (2) to 
substitute in (4) and (5) gives 
(6) x\ - f*'H(w, 0;, </>,) dw - yH(x'r 0;, 4>t) — rtK 
(7) 1 - H(x'v 0;, </>,) - yh(x'v 0;, 0,) = 0. 
Given the market expected return rv (6) and (7) 
determine x\ and 6[. 
Let pt denote the price of fiat money in period t, in 
terms of the consumption good. The expected return on 
fiat money in period t is then Etpt+l/pr The type 1 
lender, who is indifferent between consuming leisure 
and producing the consumption good to exchange for 
fiat money, has 5 = Etpt+x/pr Similarly, the type 2 
lender, indifferent between holding intermediary notes 
and holding fiat money, has rt~ a = EtpJ+xlpr And 
the type 3 lender, indifferent between holding inter-
mediary deposits and holding fiat money, has rt — (3 = 
Etpt+Xlpr Equilibrium in the market for fiat money 
therefore implies that 
(8) r]xA(Etpt+x/pt) 
+ rj2[l-B(rrEtpt+x/pt)] 
+ rj3[ 1 —F(r—Etpt+ {/pt)] = ptM0 
where the left side of (8) is the demand for fiat money 
(with the three terms representing the demand for fiat 
money by type 1, type 2, and type 3 lenders, respec-
tively) and the right side of (8) is the supply of fiat 
money. In the credit market, equilibrium implies that 
(9) r]2B(rrEtpt+x/pt)
 + r]3F(rrEtpt+x/pt) 
= r;4K[l-G(0/)] 
where the first term on the left side of (9) is credit 
supplied (through financial intermediaries) by note-
holders, the second term on the left side is credit 
supplied by intermediary depositors, and the right side 
is credit demanded by entrepreneurs. 
Now restrict attention to the stationary monetary 
equilibrium, where pt> 0 for all t and quantities and 
prices depend only on the state </>r Let subscripts denote 
the state. Then 
(10) Etpt+X = q{px +(1 -qt)p2 
for (j>t = 4>i and i — 1,2. Let 5" = px/p2. Then from (8), 






+ V3[l-F(r2-q2s-l+q2)]} = 0 
4Formal arguments rely on the law of large numbers (Williamson 
1986,1987c), though there are some subtleties here because of the continuum 
of agents. 
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(12) ri2B<jx-q-(\-qx)ls) 
+ v3F(r-q-(l-q{)/s) = rj4K[\-G(d[)] 
(13) r]2B(r2-q2s-\+q2) + rj3F(r2-q2s-\+q2) 
— rj4K[\ — G(02)]. 
Also, from (6) and (7), for i — 1,2, 
(14) x; -fo'H(w, d;, </>,) dw - yH(x'if 0/, </>,) = rtK 
(15) 1 - //(*;, 0/, </>,.) - yh(x'i} 0;, (/>,) = 0. 
Equationsd 1)-(15) solve for5, rjf 0/, andjc-for/ = l, 2. 
The U.S. Economy 
Here I treat the U.S. economy as simply a larger-scale 
version of the Canadian economy. Note that in the 
model summarized by equations (11)-(15), the mea-
sure of the Canadian population N is irrelevant for 
determining equilibrium interest rates and prices. Let 
jY* denote the measure of the U.S. population, which is 
on the order of 1(W for the 1870-1930 period. 
Recall that at the time, there were two key differ-
ences between U.S. and Canadian monetary and bank-
ing arrangements: 
•U.S. banks were mostly unit banks that could not 
diversify to the extent of their Canadian counter-
parts. 
• Restrictions on private note issue in the United 
States implied that bank notes could not be backed 
by private assets. 
An extreme version of the first (unit banking) 
restriction is a prohibition on all diversification. 
Assume that no agent can hold claims on more than one 
investment project. With this restriction, financial 
intermediaries have no role in the model; instead, all 
lending and borrowing is done directly between type 3 
lenders and entrepreneurs. However, this outcome can 
be interpreted as a banking arrangement where, for 
every funded project, there is one bank with K de-
positors. Optimal contracts with entrepreneurs are debt 
contracts, as in the case without the unit banking 
restriction (Williamson 1986), but there is now no 
delegated monitoring. If the entrepreneur (bank) de-
faults, all ^depositors incur the verification cost. That 
is, the depositors incur collective verification costs of 
Ky with unit banking and y with perfect diversification. 
Therefore, for the unit banking system, the expected 
return to a bank's depositors is 
(16) tt*Ot;, 0,4>r) = - /o' H(w, e, </>,) dw 
- yKH(x*v 0,0,) 
where the asterisk (*) superscripts denote variables and 
functions for the U.S. economy. Given (16), then for the 
U.S. economy (14) and (15) become 
(17) x;*-!^ H(w, 6;*,^) dw 
-yKH{x[\d;\<t>i) = KK 
(18) 1 - HOt;*, e;\</>,) - yo;\</>,) = o 
for i = 1,2. 
The second restriction can be captured in the model 
by simply closing off the issue of notes by private 
agents. Type 2 lenders are then forced to hold fiat 
money, just as U.S. residents who wished to hold 
circulating notes could either hold U.S. Treasury notes 
or national bank notes backed by U.S. government 
bonds. In contrast, Canadian residents had the option of 
holding large-denomination private circulating notes 
backed by private loans. Given the restriction on private 
note issue, instead of (11)—(13) the U.S. economy has 
(19) rj{A(q{+(l-q{V^) + ri2 
+ rl3[\-F(r*-qr(\-ql)/s*)] 
- s*{rilA(q2s*-\-\—q2) + r)2 
+ rj3[l-F(rZ-q2s*-\+q2)]} = 0 
(20) rj3F(r*-q-a-qi)/s*) = rj4[\~G(0[*)] 
(21) r]3F(r2—q2s*—\-\-q2) = r/4[l-G(fl^)]. 
The differences between (11)-(13), on the one hand, 
and (19)—(21), on the other, arise because under the 
U.S. regime all type 2 lenders hold fiat money and none 
of them contributes to the supply of credit to entre-
preneurs. 
For the U.S. economy, (16)—(21) determine s* and 
jc/*, r* for i= 1,2. Note that with the unit banking 
system, banks fail with positive probability. For a bank 
that lends to an entrepreneur with parameter 0 in period 
t, the probability of failure is Pr[w < Jt*(0)]. Here, jc*(0) 
is the payment promised by the entrepreneur that 
satisfies 
29 (22) 7r*(jt,*(0), 6, 4>t) = r*K. 
The number of banks that fail in period t + 1 is then 
(23) = N*l0e;. H(x*(d\ 6, </>,)g(0) rffl. 
The contractual arrangement with unit banking can 
be interpreted as involving a bank run when a bank 
failure occurs. That is, the verification cost y could 
represent the cost to each depositor of getting to the 
bank early to withdraw a deposit. On receiving a signal 
at the beginning of period t + 1 that failure is imminent, 
each depositor incurs the cost of running to the bank, 
each receives less than the promised return, and the 
bank fails. Runs are never observed when banks are 
perfectly diversified, because then depositors would 
never need to verify the return on the bank's portfolio. 
With this interpretation of bank runs and failures, 
this model seems better able to confront U.S. and 
Canadian experience than the bank runs model of 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or the related model of 
Postlewaite and Vives (1987). These other models rely 
on inherent features of the deposit contract to explain 
runs, which leaves the very different behavior of the 
U.S. and Canadian banking systems unexplained. 
Model Implications 
I now explore some of the model's implications for the 
interaction between financial structure and macroeco-
nomic fluctuations. 
For Aggregate Fluctuations 
Having characterized an equilibrium in equations (11)-
(15) for the Canadian economy and in (16)—(21) for 
the U.S. economy, I proceed to analyze aggregate 
fluctuations in the two economies. This analysis is 
carried out by determining the qualitative comove-
ments among key aggregate variables in each economy 
and making quantitative comparisons across the two. 
(The methods used to do this are detailed in Williamson 
1989.) 
I use the following approach: For each economy, 
start with a benchmark equilibrium in which there are 
no fluctuations—that is, where there are no shocks 
(</>, = </> for all t) with s=l, r{=r2 = r, and d[ = 02 — 0' 
in the Canadian economy, and similarly for the U.S. 
economy. Then, subject the two parallel economies to a 
small perturbation around the benchmark equilibrium. 
We now have </>! = </> and </>2 > </>, where </>2 — </>1 is 
small. The perturbations to the benchmark equilibrium 
are small, the economy can be only in one of two states, 
and the underlying disturbance (</>) evolves in an analyti-
cally convenient way (as a Markov process). As a result 
it is easy, using calculus, to derive algebraic formulas 
for the variances and covariances of key variables. 
As shown rigorously in Williamson 1989, fluctua-
tions in the two economies are qualitatively similar. In 
both countries, bank liabilities (bank notes plus de-
posits) and the price level (the inverse of the price of fiat 
money) are procyclical. That is, each of these variables 
and output are mutually positively correlated. Thus, if 
both economies are subjected to the same real distur-
bances, they experience business cycles that move in 
phase. The mean-preserving spread in the distribution 
of investment project returns that occurs in state 2 can 
be thought of as a decrease in the demand for credit. 
This disturbance causes the real interest rate r and the 
quantity of credit extended by intermediaries to fall 
in state 2 relative to state 1. This credit decrease is 
matched by a decrease in the quantity of bank lia-
bilities, so the demand for fiat money rises and the price 
level falls. Output tends to be higher in state 1 than in 
state 2 for two reasons. One is that the expected real rate 
of return on fiat money is higher in state 1, so lenders 
work more and consume less leisure. The other reason 
is that since the shock </>, is positively serially correlated, 
a period with a high quantity of credit extended is 
followed by state 1 with higher probability than by state 
2. Thus, output from the previous period's investment 
tends to be higher in state 1 than in state 2. 
The perturbation has two effects on the volatility of 
U.S. bank failures. First, the number of failures tends to 
be larger in state 2 because entrepreneurs with the same 
characteristics (the same 0) and who receive loans in 
states 1 and 2 face a higher promised payment x*(0) in 
state 2 (the state where investment projects are riskier). 
In state 2, therefore, banks that fund projects of the 
same quality have a higher probability of failing than 
in state 1. Second, since 0'* is higher in state 1 than in 
state 2, the average quality of projects (without taking 
account of the change in riskiness) is lower in state 1. 
This tends to make the number of failures larger in state 
1 than in state 2. The first effect tends to induce 
countercyclical bank failures; the second, procyclical 
bank failures. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
first effect dominates, so that bank failures are counter-
cyclical, as is true in the U.S. data for this period. 
The next step is to make a quantitative comparison 
of fluctuations in the two economies. (Again, the details 
appear in Williamson 1989.) The effect of the unit 
banking restriction and of the prohibition on private 
bank note issue (each considered separately) is to make 
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Charts 2 and 3 
How Two Restrictions Affect Fluctuations Induced by Project Risk in the Credit Market 














Chart 3 Prohibition on Private Bank Notes 
Interest 
Rate (r) 






;Sl With No Prohibition 






/ /i \ 
/ /1 \ 
r / i \ 
/r v / i \  / i V l \ 
\ X 







per capita bank liabilities, per capita output, and the 
price level less variable. Though the unit banking 
restriction makes bank deposits less variable, deposits 
become more variable with a prohibition on private 
note issue. 
Some partial equilibrium intuition may clarify the 
forces that produce these results. Ignoring the dynamic 
effects from movements in the price level, think of the 
model in terms of credit supply and demand, where the 
competitively determined price is the interest rate r. In 
Chart 2, the credit demand curve D0 is determined by 
the number of investment projects that, if funded, will 
yield a return per lender of at least r. Credit supply is 
determined by the number of lenders who hold inter-
mediary liabilities for each r. With branch banking and 
no prohibition on bank note issue, an increase in the 
riskiness of investment projects shifts the demand curve 
to DQ, since fewer projects are now creditworthy for 
each r. As a result the interest rate, the quantity of 
projects financed, and output (in the subsequent period) 
fall. With the imposition of a unit banking system, the 
credit demand curve becomes less elastic. That is, if an 
entrepreneur defaults, the verification costs incurred by 
lenders are now yK rather than K, so expected verifi-
cation costs increase more rapidly as the quality of 
investment projects (0) decreases. An increase in riski-
ness for all projects thus shifts D{ to Dp and the change 
in the interest rate and the quantity of projects financed 
is smaller than with perfect diversification. 
The effect of a prohibition on private bank notes is 
shown in Chart 3. As the supply of credit becomes less 
elastic (S0 shifts to Sj), agents who would otherwise 
hold intermediated assets instead hold unproductive 
fiat currency. When risk increases for all projects 
(shifting D0 to DQ), the quantity of credit falls less than 
it would have otherwise. Thus, credit, bank liabilities, 
and output are more volatile when private bank note 
issue is permitted. 
31 In the model, disturbances that make credit more 
volatile also tend to make prices more volatile since, 
with a fixed nominal stock of currency, the price level 
equates the supply of and the demand for fiat money. 
When private bank note issue is permitted, deposits 
tend to be less volatile because the interest rate is less 
volatile and because price movements induce more 
substitution into fiat currency from deposits. 
The fact that the unit banking restriction induces less 
volatility in aggregate activity is perhaps surprising. In 
the model U.S. (unit banking) economy, countercyclical 
bank failures are observed. Relaxing this restriction in 
the model makes bank failures a constant (that is, zero). 
Thus, intuition might suggest that aggregate volatility 
should be smaller in the model Canadian economy with 
perfectly diversified banks. But the model contradicts 
this intuition. 
The model also seems at odds with the views of 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke (1983), and 
Hamilton (1987). Friedman and Schwartz assign an 
important macroeconomic role to bank failures in the 
United States during the Depression, a role they think 
operated through reductions in measured monetary 
aggregates. Bernanke and Hamilton argue that bank 
failures in the Depression had effects other than those 
reflected in monetary aggregates. However, note that 
both Bernanke (1983, pp. 266-67) and Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963, pp. 352-53) have difficulty reconcil-
ing their views with Canadian experience in the 
Depression. During this time, Canada and the United 
States experienced comparable declines in output, but 
no Canadian banks failed (Haubrich 1987). 
With Deposit Insurance 
Government deposit insurance programs have played 
an important role in discussions of banking insta-
bility—for example, in Diamond and Dybvig 1983. 
Such a program can be introduced into the model's unit 
banking system as follows. Assume the government is 
an agent that can supply effort to monitor entrepre-
neurs. The government guarantees all bank depositors 
a certain return in each period. If a bank fails, the 
government verifies the return on the bank's portfolio. 
Lump-sum taxes are levied, either on banks or on 
depositors. The taxes are just sufficient to compensate 
depositors in failed banks and to compensate the 
government for effort expended in monitoring banks. 
This arrangement yields an equilibrium allocation 
identical to the one achieved with perfectly diversified 
banks. 
Canadian and U.S. banking and monetary arrange-
ments since World War II can be viewed as equivalent. 
With the establishment of the Bank of Canada in 1935, 
private bank note issue was prohibited in Canada, and 
Canadian banks were, if anything, larger and better 
diversified after the war than before. The U.S. deposit 
insurance system can be seen as accomplishing a 
function similar to that of a well-diversified banking 
system; the only difference is that in the U.S. system, 
monitoring is delegated partly to the government rather 
than entirely to private financial intermediaries. The 
model constructed here, then, predicts that, other things 
held constant, aggregate fluctuations should have sim-
ilar properties across the two countries in the postwar 
period. 
The Empirical Evidence 
Comparing Canadian and U.S. Data 
I now examine annual aggregate data for Canada and 
the United States for the periods 1870-1913 and 
1954-1987. I attempt to discover whether the evi-
dence is consistent with the model and its implications. 
The aggregate data come from several sources. For 
Canada from 1870-1913, Urquhart (1986) construc-
ted series for constant dollar GNP and the implicit price 
deflator. He used a value-added method to assemble the 
GNP data, and the resulting series seems to be consider-
ably better than the U.S. data available for this period. 
For U.S. constant dollar GNP in 1870-1913,1 use two 
alternative series constructed by Romer (1989) and 
Balke and Gordon (1989). They used similar regression 
methods but different underlying data. These series 
seem to be the best existing measures of U.S. GNP for 
this period. They have similar low frequency properties, 
but their cyclical properties are different. For implicit 
price deflators for 1870-1913, I use a standard his-
torical series from Balke and Gordon 1986 and an 
updated series from Balke and Gordon 1989. Data on 
chartered bank deposits and bank notes in circulation in 
Canada in 1870-1913 come from monthly statements 
by the chartered banks, published in the Canada Year 
Book (1915). Data on U.S. commercial bank deposits 
are from Friedman and Schwartz (1970), but these are 
inferior to the Canadian data, since the U.S. series was 
constructed from national banks' infrequent call reports 
and from scant state bank data. For 1954-1987, data 
come from the C ANSIM data base, the Federal Reserve 
Board data base, and the FDIC Annual Report (various 
years). 
All time series were subjected to a log transforma-
tion and were detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
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(Prescott 1983), which essentially fits a smooth, time-
varying trend to the data.
5 Multiplying the resulting 
series by 100 gives time series that are percentage 
deviations from trend. The model yields predictions 
about unconditional variances and covariances of per 
capita aggregates in economies that do not grow. Thus, 
the data transformations account as well as seems 
possible for differences between the two countries in 
long-run growth, scale, and population. 
Tables 3 and 4 show correlation matrixes for per-
centage deviations from trend of the Canadian and U.S. 
data in 1870-1913. Table 5 shows cross-country 
correlations. Also see Chart 4. Tables 3 and 4 are 
generally consistent with the model, in that all but one 
of the series are mutually positively correlated in both 
countries. In addition, Table 5 shows a high degree of 
correlation between corresponding variables in the two 
countries. This is consistent with the assumption that 
real disturbances common to both countries dominate 
over this period. 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 show correlations for the period 
1954-1987 and correspond to Tables 3,4, and 5. Also 
see Chart 5. Tables 6 and 7 indicate some inconsis-
tencies with the model. In the Canadian data, there is 
essentially no correlation between GNP and the price 
level, and in the U.S. data, the GNP/price level and 
price level/bank deposit correlations are negative. Also, 
in Table 8, U.S. and Canadian bank deposits are nega-
tively correlated. There thus appear to be important 
factors affecting aggregate fluctuations in Canada and 
the United States in the later period that are not 
captured in the model. Care is needed, therefore, in 
interpreting the 1954-1987 data and in comparing the 
later period with the earlier one. 
Table 9 shows standard deviations of the trans-
formed series for each time period, ratios of these 
volatility measures for Canada and the United States 
for each period, and volatility ratios for the two periods. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence supporting the model's 
predictions is in the volatility measures for the GNP 
data from both periods. From column (1), Canadian 
GNP is considerably more volatile than U.S. GNP for 
the period 1870-1913. Volatility is 56 percent greater 
using Romer's GNP data and 11 percent greater using 
Balke and Gordon's. For 1954-1987, GNP volatility 
is virtually identical in the two countries, as the 
5Here I set X, the parameter that governs the smoothness in the trend, to 
400. An increase in X makes the trend smoother. Prescott (1983) uses 
X = 1,600 for quarterly data. 
Tables 3-5 
Correlations of Percentage Deviations From Trend 
in 1870-1913 Data 





















(1)  1.000  .475  .433  .717  .588 
(2)  1.000  -.026  .522  .182 
(3)  1.000  .491  .941 
(4)  1.000  .748 
(3)+(4)  1.000 

















(1)  1.000  .691  .183  .217 
(2)  1.000  .502  .523 
(3)  1.000  .494 
(4)  1.000 




With Romer's Data .395 
With Balke & Gordon's Data .678 
Implicit Price Deflator .677 
U.S. Bank Deposits/Canadian 
Bank Notes + Deposits (all deflated) .518 
33 Charts 4 and 5 
Percentage Deviations From Trend of U.S. and Canadian Output (GNP) 
Chart 4 In 1870-1913 
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Tables 6-8 
Correlations of Percentage Deviations From Trend 
in 1954 -1987 Data 
Table 6 Canadian Matrix 
(2) (3) 
Implicit Bank Deposits 
GNP Price Deflator (deflated) 
(1) GNP 1.000 -.023 .320 
(2) Implicit Price Deflator 1.000 .594 
(3) Bank Deposits (deflated) 1.000 
Table 7 U.S. Matrix 
(1) (2) (3) 
Implicit Bank Deposits 
GNP Price Deflator (deflated) 
(1) GNP 1.000 -.528 .483 
(2) Implicit Price Deflator 1.000 -.588 
(3) Bank Deposits (deflated) 1.000 




Implicit Price Deflator .935 
Bank Deposits (deflated) -.133 
model predicts. See also Charts 4 and 5 for a visual 
representation. 
In column (1) of Table 9, Canadian prices are more 
volatile than U.S. prices for 1870-1913, as is consistent 
with the model. They are more volatile by 9 percent 
using the standard U.S. implicit price deflator and by 
54 percent using Balke and Gordon's. However, in 
column (2) of Table 9, the Canadian deflator is 21 per-
cent more volatile than the U.S. deflator in 1954-1987. 
That greater volatility is inconsistent with the model. 
Returning again to column (1), note that in the early 
period Canadian bank deposits are less volatile than 
U.S. bank deposits (deflated using either the standard 
implicit price deflator or Balke and Gordon's). This is 
not inconsistent with the model, since the prohibition on 
bank notes makes deposits more volatile. Canada's 
bank note circulation is considerably more volatile than 
its bank deposits. But bank note and deposit liabilities in 
Canada are less volatile than bank deposits in the 
United States—by approximately 12 percent using the 
standard U.S. deflator and by 21 percent using Balke 
and Gordon's deflator. In the 1870-1913 period, this is 
where the model has the most trouble explaining the 
data. However, note that in column (2), U.S. bank de-
posits are also more volatile than Canadian bank 
deposits in the 1954-1987 period. Column (3) shows 
ratios for the two periods of the Canada/U.S. bank 
liability volatility ratios—that is, the relative volatility 
between the two periods. This relative volatility mea-
sure is higher for U.S. bank liabilities, by approximately 
2 percent using the standard deflator or 12 percent 
using Balke and Gordon's deflator. Additionally, the 
model could be reconciled with the data if the U.S. bank 
deposit data for 1870-1913 contained much more 
measurement error than the corresponding Canadian 
data. As noted earlier, this possibility seems likely. 
Comparing the Industrial Composition 
of Canadian and U.S. Output 
Another possible explanation for the differences in the 
volatility of Canadian and U.S. GNP in 1870-1913 is 
that Canadian production was more concentrated in 
industries with high volatility. For example, it might be 
the case that a larger share of Canadian GNP consisted 
of production of primary commodities. Production of 
these commodities would tend to be more cyclically 
sensitive than production in other industries. To see 
whether the empirical evidence supports this alterna-
tive hypothesis, I examine comparable value-added 
data for selected U.S. and Canadian industries. 
Gallman (1960) has constructed value-added mea-
sures for four U.S. industries at five-year intervals 
overlapping the 1870-1913 period for the years 1874, 
1879,..., 1899. Urquhart( 1986) provides comparable 
annual data for Canada. The four industries are agri-
culture, mining, manufacturing, and construction, and 
the value-added measures are in current dollars. For 
Canada, these four industries accounted for 60 percent 
of gross domestic product in 1889. Table 10 shows the 
35 Table 9 
Volatility of Percentage Deviations From Trend in Two Countries and Two Periods 
Standard Deviation 
(1) (2) (D-H2) 
Country and Indicator 1870-1913 1954-1987 
Canada 
Gross National Product 
Implicit Price Deflator 
Bank Notes 
Deposits 
Liabilities (Notes + Deposits) 
United States 
Gross National Product 
Romer 
Balke & Gordon 
Implicit Price Deflator 
Standard 
Balke & Gordon 
Bank Deposits 
Standard Deflator 
Balke & Gordon Deflator 
Canada -r- United States 
Gross National Product 
Romer 
Balke & Gordon 
Implicit Price Deflator 
Standard 
Balke & Gordon 
Bank Liabilities 
Standard Deflator 
Balke & Gordon Deflator 
4.87 2.51 1.94 
3.84 4.42 .87 
9.22 
4.96 4.69 1.06 
5.26 4.69 1.12 
3.13 2.57 1.22 
4.37 2.57 1.70 
3.53 3.66 .96 
2.49 3.66 .68 
5.96 5.20 1.15 
6.64 5.20 1.28 
1.56 .98 1.59 
1.11 .98 1.13 
1.09 1.21 .90 
1.54 1.21 1.27 
.88 .90 .98 
.79 .90 .88 
percentage of value added in each of the four industries 
in Canada and the United States for the selected years. 
As anticipated, Canada had a larger portion of output in 
agriculture and a smaller portion in manufacturing than 
did the United States, and this difference persists 
through the sample period. The portion of value added 
in mining was smaller in Canada than in the United 
States through most of the period, but Canada's portion 
was slightly larger than the United States' in 1894 and 
much larger in 1899. However, this 1899 number 
was temporarily enlarged by the Klondike gold rush 
(Urquhart 1986). The portion of value added in con-
struction was consistently much smaller in Canada than 
in the United States. 
Again using the Hodrick-Prescott detrending pro-
cedure, I computed standard deviations of percentage 
deviations from trend for current Canadian dollar 
value-added measures for the four Canadian industries 
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Table 10 
Percentage of Value Added in Four Canadian and U.S. Industries 
Based on Current Canadian and U.S. Dollar Data 
Industry and Country 
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction 
Year  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S. 
1874  51.6  46.9  1.6  2.8  36.1  38.4  10.7  12.0 
1879  59.1  49.0  2.0  2.9  32.4  37.0  6.5  11.1 
1884  49.5  40.0  1.7  2.8  37.9  43.0  10.9  14.2 
1889  46.8  35.1  2.7  3.6  41.5  47.4  9.0  13.9 
1894  48.9  33.8  4.1  3.7  41.1  46.0  6.0  16.6 
1899  44.9  33.3  8.2  4.6  40.2  49.5  6.8  12.6 
Sources: Urquhart 1986, Gallman 1960 
Table 11 
Volatility of Percentage Deviations From Trend 
of Value Added in Four Canadian Industries, 
1870-1913 
Based on Current Canadian Dollar Data 
Industry  Standard Deviation 
Agriculture  8.2 
Mining  13.8 
Manufacturing  11.7 
Construction  18.4 
All Four Industries  9.0 
Source of basic data: Urquhart 1986 
in 1870-1913. These statistics are displayed in Table 
11. Surprisingly, volatility was lowest in agriculture, 
followed by manufacturing and mining; the highest 
volatility was in construction. Given the evidence from 
Table 10, the differences in the composition of output 
in Canada and the United States would tend to make 
Canadian output less volatile in the 1870-1913 period. 
As an additional check of the alternative hypothesis, 
I constructed a counterfactual nominal GNP series for 
Canada for 1870-1913. This was done as follows. Let 
Yt denote nominal GNP and yit denote nominal value 
added in industry i, where i— 1,2,3,4 for agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, and construction, respectively. 
Again, an asterisk (*) superscript denotes a U.S. 
variable. Then, counterfactual Canadian nominal GNP 
(what Canadian GNP would have been with the same 
relative composition of output as the United States in 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and construction), 
denoted Ytc} is computed as 
The weights for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, were constructed as 
follows: 
*it=(yVZUyO/(yj2Uyis) 
where s = 1874for/= 1870,..., 1876; 5 = 1879 for 
t = 1877,..., 1881; j = 1884 for t = 1882,1886; 
5= 1889 for t = 1887,..., 1891; s = 1894 for t = 
1892,..., 1896; ands = 1899 for t= 1897,..., 1913. 
The standard deviation of percentage deviations from 
trend in Yt is 7.53 and in is 7.54. This evidence 
provides no support for the alternative hypothesis that 
37 historical cross-country differences in volatility can be 
explained by differences in the composition of output. 
The relative industry volatilities in Table 11 would 
probably not be very different if the value-added 
measures were based on constant dollar data. (Urquhart 
1986 uses an aggregate price index to deflate his 
aggregate current dollar GNP measures.) For example, 
if agricultural prices were more volatile than other 
prices, and if these prices were procyclical, as was true 
for aggregate price indexes over this period, then 
agricultural output would tend to be relatively less 
volatile than in Table 11. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to adapt a macroeconomic 
model with an explicit financial intermediation struc-
ture to capture financial and monetary arrangements in 
Canada and the United States in the period 1870-1913, 
to analyze the model's implications for aggregate 
fluctuations in the two countries, and to see whether 
these implications appear to fit the facts. Over this 
period, Canada had a branch banking system, with few 
banks compared to the U.S. unit banking system. 
Canadian banks could issue circulating notes with no 
restrictions on their backing, while U.S. banks could not 
issue notes backed by private assets. Canada also 
experienced considerably less disruption due to bank 
failures than the United States did, and Canadian 
banking panics were virtually nonexistent. 
The model predicts that, with a unit banking restric-
tion, output, the price level, and bank liabilities become 
less volatile than they would be otherwise, because the 
restriction causes the demand for credit to become less 
elastic in the face of technological shocks affecting 
credit demand. This occurs despite the fact that bank 
runs and failures are countercyclical in the unit banking 
economy and the fact that there would be no such runs 
and failures in an economy where banks could diversify 
perfectly, as in a branch banking system in a large 
economy. The model also predicts that a prohibition on 
circulating bank notes reduces volatility in output, 
prices, and bank liabilities. Deposit insurance in the unit 
banking system is an equivalent arrangement to a 
perfectly diversified banking system, so that Canada 
and the United States should experience similar fluctua-
tions after World War II, everything else held constant. 
With regard to its qualitative predictions for comove-
ments, the model is consistent with aggregate annual 
data for the 1870-1913 period for Canada and the 
United States. However, the model runs into some 
problems in 1954-1987: U.S. and Canadian prices 
are countercyclical rather than procyclical as the 
model predicts. 
Relative volatilities in Canadian and U.S. GNP in 
the two periods are the most supportive of the model. 
Canadian GNP is 56 percent or 11 percent more 
volatile than U.S. GNP in 1870-1913, depending on 
the U.S. GNP measure used. Volatility is virtually equal 
in the two countries in 1954-1987. Also consistent 
with the model is the greater volatility in Canadian 
prices for 1870-1913. However, for that period, 
Canadian bank liabilities are less volatile than U.S. 
bank liabilities, in contrast to what the model predicts. 
This result is consistent with greater volatility in 
Canadian bank liabilities coupled with greater measure-
ment error in U.S. bank liabilities. This possibility 
seems likely, since Canadian bank liabilities were 
measured with greater frequency and accuracy for the 
1870-1913 period. 
What message does this paper have with regard to 
policy? The model tells us that instability in the banking 
system has less to do with inherent features of banking 
contracts and more to do with the way the banking 
system is regulated. Also, somewhat paradoxically, the 
elimination of some regulations may make banking 
more stable while causing more volatility in aggregate 
economic activity. Though the swings in aggregate 
activity are wider without these regulations, that does 
not mean that economic welfare is lower. In the model, 
some agents are better off and some are worse off in the 
unregulated economy than in the regulated economy 
while, in a sense, the economy as a whole is better off in 
the unregulated case (the allocation is Pareto optimal). 
Does this mean that the United States would have 
been better off if government deposit insurance had 
not been introduced in the 1930s and impediments 
to branch banking had been eliminated instead? Would 
it be advisable to drop these impediments today and 
possibly eliminate deposit insurance? In the context of 
the model constructed in the paper, the answer to both 
questions is yes. However, the model does not capture 
some of the detrimental effects from having a banking 
industry with a small number of large firms—that is, the 
well-known efficiency losses from monopoly power. 
Thus, the optimal design of a banking system involves a 
careful assessment of the relative costs of bank failures, 
collusion in the banking industry (implicit or explicit), 
and the costs of regulatory programs such as deposit 
insurance. Note also that recent developments in the 
financial industry, such as securitization (the holding of 
securities—for example, mortgage loans—by institu-
tions in which the securities do not originate), make 
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regulations inhibiting branch banking less important in 
the United States. However, to the extent that securitiza-
tion allows greater diversification by banks, it weakens 
the case for government-provided deposit insurance. 
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